This paper studies a new and challenging wireless surveillance problem where a legitimate monitor attempts to eavesdrop two suspicious communication links simultaneously. To facilitate concurrent eavesdropping, our multi-antenna legitimate monitor employs a proactive eavesdropping via jamming approach, by selectively jamming suspicious receivers to lower the transmission rates of the target links. In particular, we are interested in characterizing the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the minimum-mean-squared-error (MMSE) receiver case, by optimizing the legitimate monitor's jamming transmit covariance matrix subject to its power budget. As the monitor cannot hear more than what suspicious links transmit, the achievable eavesdropping rate region is essentially the intersection of the achievable rate region for the two suspicious links and that for the two eavesdropping links.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many infrastructure-free wireless communication networks (e.g., device-todevice (D2D) communications, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communications, and mobile ad hoc communications) have emerged as important decentralized supplements to conventional infrastructure-based wireless networks for facilitating direct information exchange among mobile users [2] - [3] . However, these infrastructure-free communication networks may be misused by illegal users such as terrorists, criminals and business spies who deploy a UAV-mounted flying site or an ad hoc link to jeopardize public safety, commit crimes, and send back confidential information of trades. In this context, the technique of wireless surveillance was proposed, which allows the legitimate monitor to eavesdrop the suspicious communication links or jam them to disable their communications [4] - [5] .
The existing literature on wireless surveillance can be mainly classified into two categories.
The first one is passive eavesdropping, for which the legitimate monitor silently intercepts the signals of suspicious links. Note that this approach is efficient only when the channel condition of the eavesdropping link is better than that of the suspicious link. However, in practice, this condition cannot be guaranteed due to sometimes the eavesdropper has to be distant from the suspicious transmitter to avoid getting exposed. To tackle this issue, another approach, namely, proactive eavesdropping, was proposed in [6] - [7] , where the legitimate monitor operates in a fullduplex mode for receiving the suspicious signals and sending jamming signals concurrently. The jamming signals can decrease the data rate of the suspicious link and thus make the eavesdropping feasible even for the case when the eavesdropping link has a worse channel condition than the suspicious link without jamming. In addition, [8] proposed a spoofing relay approach to enhance the information surveillance capability. Recently, the proactive eavesdropping approach has been investigated under various system setups, including relay systems [9] - [12] , multi-antenna systems [13] - [14] , cognitive radio systems [15] , UAV-enabled wireless networks [16] - [17] , and parallel monitor's jamming signals, whereas the latter region is fixed when the linear minimum mean square error (MMSE) receiver is employed at the legitimate monitor.
• Theoretical characterization of the achievable eavesdropping rate region: We obtain the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver case by theoretically characterizing the achievable rate region for the suspicious links. As both suspicious links' rates are affected by the legitimate monitor's jamming covariance matrix, we jointly analyze the achievable rate region bounds for both suspicious links. Specifically, we derive the closed-form expressions of the upper and lower boundary points of the achievable rate region for the suspicious links. Moreover, we prove that beamforming is indeed the optimal jamming transmit strategy for the legitimate monitor, and analyze the monotonicity of both the upper and lower boundary curves. Based on these results, we analytically characterize the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver case. In addition, since the achievable rate region for suspicious links is in general non-convex, we also propose a timesharing based jamming strategy to enlarge this region and characterize the corresponding achievable eavesdropping rate region.
• Enlargement of the achievable eavesdropping rate region via successive interference cancellation: We also extend our study to the case in which the legitimate monitor applies a non-linear MMSE and successive interference cancellation (MMSE-SIC) receiver to decode the suspicious signals. For this case, we characterize the achievable eavesdropping rate region by jointly optimizing the time-sharing factor between different decoding orders at the legitimate monitor. Moreover, we derive the optimal time-sharing factor that is sufficient to achieve any point in the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE-SIC receiver case.
It is worth pointing out that the scenario of wireless legitimate surveillance over multiple suspicious links was also considered in [19] , where all suspicious links transmit on orthogonal frequency bands without interfering with each other, and the legitimate monitor has one single receiver antenna and one single transmit antenna. The design criteria in [19] is to maximize weighted sum eavesdropping rate. Different from [19] , we consider a more complicated multiantenna surveillance case and focus on characterizing the entire achievable eavesdropping rate region by optimizing the jamming transmit covariance matrix.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model and defines the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver case. Section III first vers. Both the suspicious transmitters send independent suspicious messages to their corresponding receivers over the same frequency band simultaneously. The legitimate in a full-duplex manner, and we assume that the self-interference can be studies the achievable rate region for the suspicious links and then characterizes the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver case. Section IV extends the study to the MMSE-SIC receiver case. Numerical results are given in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
Notation:
In this paper, we use boldface lowercase and uppercase letters to denote vectors and matrices, respectively. For a Hermitian matrix A, A H , Tr (A), and Rank (A) respectively denote its conjugate transpose, trace and rank, while A 0 means that A is a positive semi-definite matrix. I denotes an identity matrix with an appropriate dimension. a computes the Euclidean norm of a complex vector a. For a complex number z, ∠z denotes its phase. For any two sets
is a proper subset (or a subset) of R 2 , and R 1 ∩ R 2 and R 1 ∪ R 2 , denote the intersection and union between R 1 and R 2 , respectively. All the log (·) functions have base-2 by default.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider proactive eavesdropping over two suspicious communication links, including one legitimate monitor and two suspicious communication pairs. The suspicious transmitters (Alice 1 and Alice 2) and receivers (Bob 1 and Bob 2) are each equipped with one antenna. The legitimate monitor is equipped with N r receiving antennas for receiving the suspicious messages and N t transmitting antennas to send jamming signals for disrupting suspicious receivers. Both the suspicious transmitters send independent suspicious messages to their corresponding receivers over the same frequency band simultaneously. The legitimate monitor operates in a full-duplex manner, and we assume that the self-interference can be perfectly canceled by using advanced analog and digital self-interference cancellation schemes [20] . As will be shown later in Section V, the assumption of perfect self-interference cancellation is reasonable in our considered scenario.
Let h i,i ∈ C 1×1 denote the channel coefficient of the ith suspicious link (from the ith suspicious transmitter to the ith suspicious receiver, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}), h i,j ∈ C 1×1 denote the channel coefficient of the ith interference link (from the ith suspicious transmitter to the jth suspicious receiver, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j = i), and h i,m ∈ C Nr×1 denote the channel vector of the ith eavesdropping link (from the ith suspicious transmitter to the receiver antennas of the legitimate monitor), respectively. Furthermore, let g i ∈ C Nt×1 denote the jamming channel vector from the legitimate monitor to the ith suspicious receiver. To characterize the fundamental information-theoretic performance limits of proactive eavesdropping over two suspicious links, we assume that the legitimate monitor has the perfect channel state information (CSI) of all links. In practice, the legitimate monitor can acquire the CSI of h i,m and g i by overhearing the pilot signals sent by suspicious transmitters and suspicious receivers, respectively. On the other hand, it can obtain the CSI of h i,i and h i,j by eavesdropping the feedback channels of each suspicious transmitterreceiver pair [8] . We also assume that suspicious transmitters are unaware of the existence of legitimate monitor and thus they do not employ any anti-eavesdropping or anti-jamming methods [4] - [6] .
The achievable rate of the ith suspicious link is given by
where Q ∈ C Nt×Nt denotes the jamming transmit covariance matrix at the legitimate monitor, P i is the transmit power of the ith suspicious transmitter, and σ 2 i denotes the noise power at the ith suspicious receiver. For notation simplicity, we denoteσ
, 2}, i = j as the effective noise power at the ith suspicious receiver.
We define the achievable rate region for the suspicious links to be the union of all suspicious rate pairs R S 1 (Q) , R S 2 (Q) over all possible choices of the jamming transmit covariance matrix Q ∈ Ω. Specifically, in the case without (w/o) time-sharing among different jamming transmit covariance matrices, the achievable rate region for the suspicious links is given by
where Ω = {Q|Q 0, Tr (Q) ≤ P max } is the feasible set of Q, with P max denoting the maximum transmit power at the legitimate monitor. Note that the achievable region R S w/o−TS also depends on the constant transmission powers, P 1 and P 2 , of the two suspicious transmitters. It is also worth noting that the set R S w/o−TS is compact because the feasible set Ω is compact and the mapping from Q to R
The MMSE receiver is a linear receiver structure, which optimally trades off capturing the define the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver case as the intersection of the regions R in (4) = log 1 +
, and R max 2 = log 1 +
Proof: The minimum value of R S 1 (Q) is obtained by solving the optimization problem:
, which has the same optimal solution as the following problem:
According to [22, Lemma 1], we know that the optimal solution to problem (6) is
is the maximum-ratio transmission (MRT) beamformer in the direction of g 1 with the maximum transmit power P max . Thus, we have R
Similarly, we can obtain that R min 2 = log 1 +
, which is achievable with the jamming transmit covariance matrix
Moreover, it is easy to check that both R S 1 (Q) and R S 2 (Q) are maximized when the legitimate monitor keeps silent and does not send any jamming signals, i,e, Q = 0. Thus, we have R
Note that there exists a rectangle specified by the four vertices R To clearly characterize the achievable region R S w/o−TS , we next propose an efficient approach to obtain its entire upper and lower boundaries. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , for each fixed R
at Bob 1, we derive the corresponding maximum and minimum achievable rates of Bob 2 (denoted by f max (R 1 ) and f min (R 1 ), respectively) by solving the following two optimization problems.
It is worth pointing out that the achievable rate-pairs (R 1 , f max (R 1 )) and (R 1 , f min (R 1 )) are, respectively, the upper and lower boundary points of the region R . In the following two subsections, we focus on solving problems (7) and (8) by determining the jamming transmit covariance matrix Q, respectively.
A. Optimal Solution to Problem (7)
In this subsection, we aim to analytically derive the optimal solution to problem (7) and obtain the closed-form expression of f max (R 1 ).
To solve problem (7), we first reformulate it as the following equivalent form
where φ (R 1 ) =
In fact, problem (9) is a semi-definite programming (SDP) problem, which can be solved using the existing numerical optimization toolbox such as CVX [23] . However, the numerical approach cannot provide enough insights on the solution structure. To gain more insights of the optimal solution, we adopt an analytical approach and first provide the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Let Q * denote the optimal solution to problem (9), we then have Rank (Q * ) ≤ 1.
Proof: Notice that problem (9) is a separable SDP problem with two constraints besides Q 0. According to [24, Theorem 3.2] , the rank of the optimal solution to problem (9) should satisfy the inequality constraint:
Thus, we obtain that Rank (Q * ) ≤ 1, which completes the proof.
According to Lemma 2, we know that beamforming is indeed optimal for the legitimate monitor to attain the upper boundary points of the region R S w/o−TS . Thus, we can rewrite Q = ww H with w ∈ C Nt×1 . Then, problem (9) is transformed to
We have the following lemma, which provides the structure of the optimal solution to problem (10).
Lemma 3:
The optimal jamming beamforming vector w opt to problem (10) is in the form of
, where α and β are two complex weights,
H 2 g 1 denoting the projection of g 1 onto the null space ofĝ 2 . Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. Lemma 3 tells that the optimal jamming beamforming vector to problem (10) should lie in the space spanned byĝ 2 andĝ ⊥ 2 , as depicted in Fig. 3 . Then, by substituting w = αĝ 2 + βĝ ⊥ 2 into problem (10), it follows that
It is observed that the objective function of problem (11) only depends on α and is regardless of β. Therefore, we need to find the minimum amplitude of α under the condition that the constraints in problem (11) are not violated. Then, we derive the following theorem, which provides the closed-form solution to problem (11). (11), thus yielding the optimal = 0 as shown in Theorem 1. In this case, we also notice thatĝ max , which means the legitimate monitor of the transmit power to send jamming signals. Otherwise, if < R
ZF2
or equivalently > P maxĝ , the legitimate monitor has to send jamming signals in of power budget for achieving in = 0 = 0, and max . Accordingly, the achievable of Bob 2 will be inevitably reduced. 
Theorem 1:
The closed-form optimal solution to problem (11) is given by
where
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
2 in (12) could be re-expressed in terms of R 1 as R 1 ≥ log 1 +
is the value of R 1 when jamming signals are sent at the legitimate monitor with the zero-forcing (ZF) is the minimum value of R 1 that the legitimate monitor can achieve without reducing the achievable rate of Bob 2. Therefore, when
2 , jamming signals are sent only in the direction ofĝ ⊥ 2 for minimizing the objective function of (11), thus yielding the optimal α * = 0 as shown in Theorem 1. In this case, we also notice that |β 
2 , the legitimate monitor has to send jamming signals in both the directions ofĝ 2 andĝ ⊥ 2 with its maximum transmit power budget for achieving R 1 , resulting in α * = 0, β * = 0, and |α
Accordingly, the achievable rate of Bob 2 will be inevitably reduced.
By combining Theorem 1 and Lemma 3, we obtain the closed-form optimal solution w opt = α * ĝ 2 +β * ĝ⊥ 2 to problem (10) . By substituting w opt into the objective function of problem (7), we directly obtain the following theorem, which provides the closed-form expression of f max (γ 1 ).
Theorem 2:
The closed-form expression of f max (R 1 ) is given by
From Theorem 2, it follows that if
, which indicates the jamming signals sent by the legitimate monitor for reducing the achievable rate of Bob 1 do not decrease that of Bob 2. Otherwise, if R 1 < R ZF2 1 , then the achievable rate of Bob 2 will also be reduced by jamming signals.
To examine the characterized region R S w/o−TS more explicitly, next, we further investigate the monotonicity of f max (R 1 ). Note that f max (R 1 ) given in (13) has two cases, and it is equal to a constant value when R 1 ≥ R ZF2 1 . Thus, in the following, we only study the monotonicity of
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C. Proposition 1 is also illustrated in Fig. 2 and can be intuitively explained as follows. From   Fig. 3 , it is observed that the amplitudes of the projections of w opt ontoĝ 1 andĝ 2 , i.e., ĝ H 1 w opt and ĝ H 2 w opt , are both decreasing when rotating w opt anticlockwise from the MRT beamformer w MRT1 = √ P maxĝ1 to the zero-forcing (ZF) beamformer w ZF2 = √ P maxĝ ⊥ 2 . Consequently, in this process, the corresponding rates of Bob 1 and Bob 2 are both monotonically increasing.
Thus, Proposition 1 holds. (8) In this subsection, we aim to analytically derive the optimal solution to problem (8) and provide f min (R 1 ) in closed-form.
B. Optimal Solution to Problem
We first equivalently reformulate problem (8) as
. The geometric explanation of optĝĝ to problem (15) .
Following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 2, we can prove that the optimal solution to problem (14) to Lemma 3, we have the following lemma, which provides the structure of the optimal to problem (15).
4:
vector opt to problem (15) is in the form of optĝĝ , whereĝĝĝ two complex weights.
Proof: is similar to that of Lemma 3, and thus is omitted for brevity.
4 indicates that the optimal jamming beamforming vector to problem (15) Following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 2, we can prove that the optimal solution to problem (14) also satisfies Rank (Q * ) ≤ 1. Hence, by rewriting Q = ww H , problem (14) is equivalently reformulated as
Similar to Lemma 3, we have the following lemma, which provides the structure of the optimal solution to problem (15) .
Lemma 4:
The optimal jamming beamforming vector w opt to problem (15) is in the form of
and ν are two complex weights. Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3, and thus is omitted for brevity.
Lemma 4 indicates that the optimal jamming beamforming vector to problem (15) should lie in the space spanned byĝ 1 andĝ ⊥ 1 , as depicted in Fig. 4 . Note that to make problem (15) 
We then have the following theorem, which provides the closed-form optimal solution to problem (16) and the closed-form expression of f min (R 1 ).
Theorem 3:
The closed-form optimal solution to problem (16) is
and the resulting optimal value of problem (8) is given by
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
From Theorem 3, we observe that |µ * | 2 + |ν * | 2 = P max , which means the legitimate monitor needs to use its full transmit power to send jamming signals for minimizing the achievable rate of Bob 2 given the achievable rate requirement of Bob 1.
Similar to Proposition 1, we have the following proposition, whose proof is omitted for brevity.
This proposition reveals the monotonicity of f min (R 1 ) in (17).
, and is increasing in
, where
Proposition 2 is also illustrated in Fig. 2 and can be intuitively explained as follows. It is observed from Fig. 4 that the amplitude of the projection of w opt ontoĝ 1 , i.e., ĝ H 1 w opt , is decreasing when rotating w opt anticlockwise from the MRT beamformer w MRT1 to the ZF beamformer w ZF1 = √ P maxĝ ⊥ 1 . In this process, the achievable rate of Bob 1 is thus increasing. However, with the rotation of w opt from w MRT1 to w ZF1 , the amplitude of the projection of w opt ontoĝ 2 , i.e., ĝ H 2 w opt , is first increasing and then decreasing. Therefore, the resulting achievable rate of Bob 2 is first decreasing and then increasing. Hence, Proposition 2 is established.
C. Characterizing R S w/o−TS
In the previous two subsections, we have successfully derived the closed-form expressions of f max (R 1 ) and f min (R 1 ). Thus, the achievable upper and lower boundary points (R 1 , f max (R 1 )) and (R 1 , f min (R 1 )) of the region R S w/o−TS (corresponding to any feasible R 1 ) are obtained for Fig. 2 . Next, we further study whether any point within the two upper and lower boundary points is achievable. Let I R 1 denote the line segment connecting these two boundary points. We then have the following proposition, which verifies that any point on I R 1 is achievable and provides the required jamming beamforming vector.
Proposition 3:
Let (R 1 , R 2 ) be an arbitrary point on the line segment I R 1 , i.e., f min (R 1 ) ≤ R 2 ≤ f max (R 1 ). Then, the point (R 1 , R 2 ) is achievable with the jamming beamforming vector
. Proof: The minimum jamming transmit power required to attain the point (R 1 , R 2 ) is the optimal value of the following optimization problem
Following the same steps as in the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3, it is easy to verify that beamforming is the optimal jamming transmit strategy (i.e., Q = ww H ) and the optimal beamforming solution w opt is in the form of w opt = ε 1ĝ2 + ε 1ĝ ⊥ 2 . Accordingly, problem (18) is equivalently reformulated as
where φ (R 2 ) =
. Then, similar to the proof of Theorem 1, the optimal solution to problem (19) is given by
Moreover, considering f min (R 1 ) ≤ R 2 and according to (17) , we have φ (R 2 ) ≤ |µ
2 . Therefore, we can verify that |ε *
is achievable within a given jamming power budget P max .
Remark 1:
According to Proposition 3, we know that each point on the line segment I R 1 is achievable. Hence, the entire achievable region R 
where (R 1 , R 2 ) and (R 
2 ) is achievable. Therefore, by adjusting the value of τ , any point on the segment connecting these two points is achievable.
Note that the region R 
It is easy to verify that R 
IV. EXTENSION TO MMSE-SIC RECEIVER CASE
In this section, we extend our study for characterizing the achievable eavesdropping rate region from the linear MMSE receiver in Section II to the non-linear MMSE-SIC receiver.
To be specific, we first describe the achievable rate region for the eavesdropping links with the MMSE-SIC receiver, which is always larger than that with the MMSE receiver. Then, we
5. An illustrative example of the achievable rate region MMSE SIC two eavesdropping links at the monitor.
vable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE-SIC receiver and analyze to achieve any point within this region.
of MMSE-SIC is for the monitor to decode one suspicious message MMSE receiver first, and then subtract it from the received signal before decoding the other = [ , π vector: the message of the suspicious link is decoded first, and its effect is then removed from the received signal.
, the achievable rates of the eavesdropping links are respectively given by characterize the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE-SIC receiver and analyze the required scheme to achieve any point within this region.
The fundamental principle of MMSE-SIC is for the monitor to decode one suspicious message with MMSE receiver first, and then subtract it from the received signal before decoding the other suspicious message [25] . Let π = [π 1 , π 2 ] denote the decoding order vector: the message of the π 1 -th suspicious link is decoded first, and its effect is then removed from the received signal.
Consequently, the achievable rates of the π 1 -th and π 2 -th eavesdropping links are respectively given by
For example, if the legitimate monitor decodes the message of the first suspicious link first, i.e., π 1 = 1 and π 2 = 2, then the achievable rates of the first and second eavesdropping links are explicitly written as R given by (as shown in Fig. 5 )
, on the line segment connecting the points A and B is achievable by employing the time-sharing between the two decoding orders, with the following adjustable time-sharing factor:
That is, the legitimate monitor uses the decoding order π = [1, 2] during the first ς R MMSE-SIC receiver yields larger achievable rate region for the eavesdropby the MMSE receiver, i.e., MMSE ⊆ R MMSE SIC , we have
MMSE TS

MMSE SIC TS
, we discuss the scheme for the legitimate monitor to achieve any point in
. It is necessary for the legitimate monitor to jointly choose factor between different decoding orders as well as the jamming beamforming vector so as to guarantee ∈ R MMSE SIC ∈ R
TS
. While the jamming is already analyzed and given in Section IV, we only need to update the timefactor of decoding orders for MMSE SIC region only, as given by
V. NUMERICAL ESULTS
In this section, we present numerical examples to show the achievable eavesdropping rate regions by our proactive jamming approach. We consider the two-dimensional (2D) Cartesian X and Y axes on the ground plane shown in Fig. 6 , where Alice 1, 2, Bob 1, and Bob 2 are respectively located at (0 0) (0 200 meters) (100 meters 0) (100 meters 200 meters), and = ( , y of the legitimate monitor.
We adopt the distance-dependent pass loss model, which is given by Note that since the MMSE-SIC receiver yields larger achievable rate region for the eavesdropping links than that by the MMSE receiver, i.e., R
Finally, we discuss the scheme for the legitimate monitor to achieve any point in R
. It is necessary for the legitimate monitor to jointly choose the time-sharing factor between different decoding orders as well as the jamming beamforming vector so as to guarantee z ∈ R E MMSE−SIC and z ∈ R S w/o−TS concurrently. While the jamming beamforming is already analyzed and given in Section IV, we only need to update the timesharing factor of decoding orders for R E MMSE−SIC region only, as given by
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical examples to show the achievable eavesdropping rate regions by our proactive jamming approach. We consider the two-dimensional (2D) Cartesian coordinate system with X and Y axes on the ground plane shown in Fig. 6 , where Alice 1, Alice 2, Bob 1, and Bob 2 are respectively located at (0, 0), (0, 200 meters), (100 meters, 0), and (100 meters, 200 meters), and M = (x i , y j ) denotes the location of the legitimate monitor.
We adopt the distance-dependent pass loss model, which is given by 
where A 0 = 10 −3 , d denotes the distance between the transmitter and the receiver, d 0 = 1 meter is a reference distance, and α = 2.5 is the path loss exponent. All the channels are randomly generated from independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) Rayleigh fading with zero mean and variance specified by (30). Unless otherwise stated, the numbers of transmitting and receiving antennas at the legitimate monitor are set to N t = N r = 2. We set the maximum transmit power at the suspicious transmitters as P 1 = P 2 = 10 dBm, and the noise power at each receiver as σ 2 = −70 dBm. All the results are obtained by averaging over 10,000 independent channel realizations.
A. Achievable Eavesdropping Rate Region with MMSE Receiver.
First, we examine the achievable eavesdropping rate regions for the case of MMSE receiver with different jamming transmit power budgets at the legitimate monitor, i.e., P max = 4 dBm or P max = 20 dBm, where the legitimate monitor is located at M = (100 meters, 100 meters). In Fig. 7 the rectangle area with vertex C denotes the achievable rate region for the eavesdropping 21 links R E MMSE . The point O corresponds to the achievable rate pair of passive eavesdropping without jamming. In Fig. 7 , the point O is outside the region R E MMSE , which tells that the passive eavesdropping cannot help the legitimate monitor eavesdrop any suspicious link. Furthermore, the irregular area with vertex O represents the achievable rate region for the suspicious links R S w/o−TS , achieved by the jamming-assisted proactive eavesdropping approach. From Fig. 7 , we can see that with larger jamming transmit power budget, the legitimate monitor can use jamming to further decrease the rates of suspicious links, allowing the legitimate monitor to decode both suspicious links' data successfully. For example, the achievable rate region of the suspicious links R S w/o−TS in Fig. 7(a) is much smaller than that in Fig. 7(b) . Specifically, the intersection of the region R S w/o−TS with the achievable rate region for the eavesdropping links R E MMSE is an empty set in Fig. 7(a) , and thus the legitimate monitor cannot eavesdrop any suspicious link; whereas the intersection of the regions R The jamming transmit power is set to be P max = 20 dBm. From Fig. 8(a) , we can see that the achievable rate region for the eavesdropping links R E MMSE is a wide rectangle area, i.e., R E 1 > R E 2 . This is due to the fact that when M = (50 meters, 70 meters), the legitimate monitor is closer to Alice 1 than to Alice 2 so that the first eavesdropping link experiences the minimal distance-dependent signal attenuation and co-channel interference caused by the second suspicious transmitter. From Fig. 8(a) , we can also observe that the legitimate monitor can eavesdrop the first suspicious link successfully even without sending any jamming signals, i.e., R This is because, as N t increases, the legitimate monitor has more degrees of freedom in spatial 
B. Achievable Eavesdropping Rate Region with MMSE-SIC Receiver
In Fig. 10 , we compare the achievable eavesdropping rate regions for both MMSE and MMSE-SIC receiver cases under different locations of the legitimate monitor, i.e., M = 100 meters, 100 meters and M = (0, 100 meters), respectively. The monitor's jamming transmit power is set to P max = 20 dBm. As we can see from second per hertz (b/s/Hz) to 0.85 b/s/Hz. This is due to the fact that when M = (0, 100 meters), the legitimate monitor is in a strong co-channel interference environment from both Alice 1 and Alice 2, and thus the performance advantage of the MMSE-SIC receiver is more significant.
C. Achievable Eavesdropping Rate Region with Imperfect Self-Interference Cancellation
In this subsection, we provide numerical results to show the impact of imperfect self-interference cancellation on the eavesdropping performance of our proposed solutions. Particularly, we focus on evaluating the effect of imperfect self-interference cancellation on the achievable eavesdropping rate region of the MMSE receiver case.
To begin, for the case with imperfect self-interference cancellation, the achievable rate of the ith eavesdropping link is modified from (3) as R E i (Q) = log 1+
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j, where H ee ∈ C Nr×Nt denotes the feedback loop channel between the transmitter antennas and the receiver antennas of the legitimate monitor, and ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the self-interference cancellation coefficient, which represents the degree of passive self-interference suppression, i.e., ρ = 0 means perfect self-interference cancellation. Let A denote the set of all jamming covariance matrices Q required to achieve the region R S w/o−TS defined in (2) . Then, the minimum achievable rate rate of the ith eavesdropping link with imperfect self-interference cancellation, denoted by (4) . In this design, the jamming covariance matrix is chosen such that H ee QH H ee = 0, i.e., jamming signals are sent in the null space of the feedback loop channel matrix H ee , thus leading to no self-interference regardless of the value of ρ. Let V ∈ C Nt×(Nt−r) denote the orthogonal basis of the null space of H ee , with r being the rank of H ee . Then, the jamming covariance matrix Q can be expressed as Q = VQV H , whereQ is a (N t − r) × (N t − r) positive semi-definite matrix. By substituting Q = VQV H into (1) and after definingg i = V H g i , we can use the same approach as in previous Section III to designQ and then characterize the achievable region
. Moreover, we note that the orthogonal basis V can be determined from the singular value decomposition of H ee (following the same approach in [8] ). It is also worth pointing out that the above null space-based jamming design works only when N t > r. Obviously, since r ≤ min {N t , N r }, a sufficient condition for N t > r to hold is that N t > N r , i.e., the legitimate monitor allocates more antennas at its transmitter than that at its receiver.
In Figs. 11(a) and 11(b), we show the impact of self-interference on our proposed solution under different self-interference cancellation coefficients, i.e., ρ = −75 dB and ρ = −55 dB, respectively, while in Figs. 11(c) and 11(d), we plot the achievable eavesdropping rate region of the null space-based jamming design with N t = 5 and N t = 7, respectively. The legitimate monitor is location at M = (100 meters, 100 meters), and the jamming transmit power budget is set to be P max = 20 dBm. From Fig. 11(a) , we can clearly see that the region R MMSE−SI w/o−TS is just slightly smaller than the region R MMSE w/o−TS (obtained by perfect self-interference cancellation). This observation suggests that ignoring the self-interference will not significantly degrade the eavesdropping performance if the self-interference cancellation coefficient is small enough, i.e. ρ ≤ −75 dB. Please note that the jointly analog and digital self-interference cancellation technique (recently reported in [20] ) is able to achieve up to 110 dB self-interference reduction, i.e., ρ = −110 dB. Thus, it is reasonable to ignore the self-interference when legitimate monitor adopts this advanced self-interference cancellation technique. Of course, if ρ increases to a huge level, e.g., −55 dB in Fig. 11(b) , then the region R MMSE−SI w/o−TS is significantly smaller than the region R MMSE w/o−TS . In this case, the legitimate monitor may choose the null space-based jamming strategy to send jamming signals in order to obtain better eavesdropping performance. This is because, from Figs. 11(b) and 11(c), it can be observed that the null space-based jamming design achieves better eavesdropping rate region than our proposed solution with imperfect self-interference cancellation. Furthermore, comparing Figs. 11(c) and 11(d), we observe that the achievable eavesdropping rate region of the null space-based jamming design is significantly enlarged as the number of jamming antennas N t increases from 5 to 7. This is due to the fact that, as N t increases, the legitimate monitor has more degrees of freedom in the null space of H ee to design jamming transmit covariance matrix, thus making it more capable of changing the achievable rate of suspicious links (i.e., increasing the corresponding achievable rate region of suspicious links, denoted by R S−NS w/o−TS ).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the proactive eavesdropping over two suspicious communication links scenario. Specifically, we first characterized the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver case with or without time sharing the jamming transmit covariance matrix.
For this purpose, we derived the closed-form expressions of the upper and lower boundary points of the achievable rate region for the two suspicious links and analyzed the monotonicity of the upper and lower boundary curves. Furthermore, we extended our study to the MMSE-SIC receiver case and characterized the corresponding achievable eavesdropping rate region, by jointly optimizing the time-sharing factor. Simulation results showed that significant performance gain is achieved with the proactive eavesdropping over the passive eavesdropping, and the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE-SIC receiver case is notably larger than that for the MMSE receiver case, especially when the legitimate monitor is in a strong co-channel interference environment.
There are several directions to study beyond this work in the future. For example, how to extend the model of two suspicious communication links to multiple links is an unsolved problem, while considering the more advanced transmitters/receivers of the suspicious links (e.g., with multiple antennas) will make the problem more challenging. For example, if the suspicious users are able to detect the jamming attack, they may adopt anti-jamming methods such as random frequency hopping to avoid jamming. In this case, how to study the interplay between the legitimate monitor and suspicious users is an interesting open problem. variables α and β as α = κe j∠α and β = ιe j∠β , respectively, where κ, ι ≥ 0. Then, problem (11) can be equivalently transformed as 
